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II 
Jose Guadalupe Perez-Jungo (Perez) appeals from his conviction 
possession of a controlled substance. He challenges the denial of his motion to 
suppress evidence found and seized during an investigative detention. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
The state charged Perez with one felony count of possession of a 
controlled substance and one misdemeanor count of possession of 
paraphernalia. (R, pp. 52-53.) filed a motion to suppress, asserting that 
his detention had been illegal. (R, pp. 67-80, 100-04, 109-13.) The state 
responded by arguing that the initial encounter was voluntary, and escalated into 
a justified detention and search upon discovery of incriminating evidence. (R, 
. 92-98.) The district court found the following facts: 
The Defendant was parked with his vehicle turned off near 100 
North near 475 East in Jerome, Idaho on November 1, 2012 at 
approximately 1 :36 a.m. Trooper Berny Marquez pulled in behind 
the Defendant's vehicle and activated his overhead lights. After 
approaching the vehicle and speaking with the Defendant, Marquez 
returned to his patrol vehicle to contact dispatch to provide 
registration information and to request a canine unit. 
Within ten minutes three other officers in three separate patrol cars 
arrived on the scene. No canine unit ever arrived. The Defendant 
was told to exit the vehicle. He was questioned, and his vehicle was 
searched from the outside with officers shining flashlights inside his 
vehicle's windows. The officers saw what they believed to be a 
controlled substance and paraphernalia. The items were removed 
from the vehicle and tested. The Defendant was eventually arrested 
and charged with felony Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Cocaine), a violation of I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) and misdemeanor 
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a violation of I.C. § 37-2734A. 
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, pp. 116-17.) The Court concluded that evidence demonstrated that the 
initial encounter was a seizure, but that the seizure was justified by both the 
community caretaking function and reasonable suspicion the vehicle was parked 
illegally. (R., pp. 128-32.) The officer then lawfully expanded the stop based on 
evidence, obtained upon contacting Perez, that Perez was under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol and suspicion there may be drugs in the vehicle. (R., p. 135.) 
The court denied the motion to suppress in relevant part. (R., p.139.) Perez 
later entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal from the 
denial of his motion to suppress, and filed an appeal timely from the entry of 
judgment. (R., pp. 157-58,172-78, 193-94.) 
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issue on as: 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Perez-Jungo's Motion to 
Suppress because his detention was unduly prolonged and, 
therefore, the subsequent search of his person and vehicle violated 
the Fourth Amendment? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Perez failed to show any error in the district court's conclusion that 
there was reasonable suspicion justifying the detention that led to the plain-sight 
discovery of contraband in Perez's vehicle? 
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ARGUMENT 
Perez Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Conclusion That 
There Was Reasonable Suspicion Justifying The Detention That Led To The 
Plain-Sight Discovery Of Contraband In Perez's Vehicle 
A. Introduction 
Officers discovered contraband in Perez's vehicle in plain sight. (R., pp. 
117, 119-20.) Perez contends that prior to this happening he was illegally 
detained, either initially or that the length of his detention exceeded the 
reasonable scope of the initial detention. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-20.) Perez has 
failed to show error, because he has failed to challenge the grounds found by the 
district court to justify the initial detention, and application of the law to the facts 
of the case shows no illegal extension of the detention. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court's 
findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but we freely review 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 
141 Idaho 728,729-730,117 P.3d 142, 143-144 (Ct. App. 2005). 
C. This Court Must Affirm The District Court's Unchallenged Determination 
That The Initial Detention Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion That 
Perez's Vehicle Was Parked Illegally 
Where the district court articulates a ground for a ruling that is 
unchallenged on appeal, the appellate court will affirm on the unchallenged 
ground. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-18, 164 P.3d 790, 797-98 (2007) 
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on grounds 
~'-=-'-' 151 Idaho 889,265 P.3d 502 (2011)); =~~~~=-:. 131 Idaho 364, 
956 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Ct App. 1998). The district court concluded that the 
evidence demonstrated the detention was justified by both the community 
caretaking function and reasonable suspicion "that the vehicle was parked 
illegally" in violation of LC. § 49-659(1), either of which justified the initial 
detention of Perez. (R., pp. 128-32.) Because Perez does not challenge the 
district court's determination that the circumstances gave rise to reasonable, 
articulable suspicion that Perez's vehicle was parked in violation of I.C. § 49-
659(1), he has failed to challenge one basis for the district court's ruling. The 
district court must therefore be affirmed on the unchallenged ground. 
The Detention Was Not Unreasonably Prolonged 
It is well established that a traffic stop is constitutionally justified if 
supported by reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has violated. United 
==~==, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); =-=-=-:...:.....:.......::...:.:..;:~, 135 Idaho 159,161 
n.1, 15 P.3d 1167, 1169 n.1 (2000), 150 Idaho 300,302,246 
P.3d 673, 675 (Ct App. 2010). "[A] detention initiated for one investigative 
purpose may disclose suspicious circumstances that expanding the 
investigation to other possible crimes." State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 
42 3d 706, 709 (Ct App. 2001). The degree of suspicion necessary is less 
than probable cause but more than speculation. 150 Idaho at 302, 246 
P.3d at 675. "A reasonable-suspicion determination 'need not rise to the level 
required probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a 
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preponderance of the evidence standard.'" State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121, '126, 
233 P.3d 52, 57 (2010) (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 
(2002)). Reasonable suspicion is "determined on the basis of the totality of the 
circumstances." State v. Widner, _Idaho _,317 P.3d 737, 741 (2013). 
The district court concluded that, after contacting Perez, Trooper Marquez 
had "objective and specific articulable facts to support his suspicion that the 
Defendant had been or was about to engage in impaired driving or drug 
trafficking." (R., p. 135.) Specifically: 
Marquez inquired as to why the Defendant was there, and he told 
Marquez that he was waiting for a friend and someone told him 
there was a potential job site nearby the area is remote 
with no businesses or nearby, so the Defendant's 
reason for "'Gems unlikely. Marquez observed the 
and glassy eyes which indicate potential 
alcohol impairment. Marquez also observed the Santa 
Muerte statue which is, as Marquez has learned through drug 
interdiction training, a common patron saint to drug traffickers. 
(Id. (footnote omitted).) The totality of the circumstances confronting the officer 
did provide reasonable suspicion of either potential DUI or involvement in drug-
related activities. Perez's act of parking in a remote area at about 1 :30 in the 
morning is somewhat suspicious in and of itself. Combined with his physical 
appearance, "unlikely" explanation for why he was there, and prominent display 
of a statuette associated with drugs, further investigation into a possible DUI or 
drug-related crimes was constitutionally warranted. 
Perez contends that bloodshot eyes "alone" do not provide reasonable 
suspicion, asserting that this fact must be considered alone because he was not 
parked "in a high crime area" and his explanation that he was looking for a job in 
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an at 1 :30 in the was "forthright " 
(Respondent's brief, . 12-14 only authority admits is "contra").) 
conceding Perez's major premise (that bloodshot eyes alone is not 
evidence to create reasonable suspicion of being under the influence of drugs or 
alcohol), Perez's argument is without merit. His argument is a blatant attempt to 
have Court apply something other than the totality of the circumstances 
by providing justifications or excuses for the other evidence supporting 
reasonable suspicion: an argument Perez admits is "contra" existing authority. 
The district court did not err by concluding that Perez's explanation that he was 
parked next to a field in a remote location at 1 :30 in the morning because he had 
heard of a job nearby was reasonably perceived by the officer as "unlikely" 
instead of "forthright and reasonable." 
Perez also requests this Court to ignore evidence of the significance of the 
"Santa Muerte" statuette, by claiming that doing so is "profiling" and relying on 
evidence his appellate attorney found on the internet. (Respondent's brief, pp. 2 
n.2, 1 19, including n.3.) not, however, object in the district court to 
consideration of the evidence of the Santa Muerte statuette (or Jesus Malverde-
marijuana leaf belt buckle later observed by the officer) on this ground. (Tr., p. 
20, L. 22 - p. 21, L. 25; p. 25, L. 24 p. 26, L. 15.) Claims not made to the trial 
court are not preserved and shouid be disregarded. State v. Parsons, 153 Idaho 
666,668,289 P.3d 1059, 1061 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Idaho appetl~ courts generally 
will not consider an assertion of error on appeal unless the issue was preserved 
in the trial court proceedings.") (citations omitted). Thus, the equal protection 
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challenge to the state's evidence must be disregarded. His attempt to submit 
new evidence for the first time on appeal is also improper. State v. Mitchell, 124 
Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct App. 1993) (in rendering a 
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review 
of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never 
before the trial court"). The state asks this Court to strike footnotes 2 and 3 from 
the Appellant's brief. Again, Perez's attempt to get this Court to ignore some of 
the circumstances known to the officer is contrary to law. 
The totality of the circumstances, including the location, the time, 
bloodshot eyes, an "unlikely" explanation for his presence, and a statuette 
associated with drug trafficking on the dashboard, provided reasonable suspicion 
of driving under the influence or that Perez was engaged in drug-related 
activities. Perez has failed to show that Trooper Marquez lacked reasonable 
suspicion to detain Perez based on the information he had based on his initial 
contact with Perez. 
Perez's Claim That Trooper Marquez Prolonged The Detention By Not 
Investigating A Possible DUI Is Both False And Irrelevant 
Perez also argues that "Trooper Marquez never actually investigated Mr. 
Peres-Jungo for driving under the influence" and "never intended to investigate 
Mr. Perez-Jungo for driving under the influence." (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) 
This argument fails for four reasons. First, it was not preserved below; second, it 
is irrelevant because the officers also had reasonable suspicion of drug crimes; 
third, the record belies Perez's factual claim that the DUI investigation was 
8 
abandoned; and, most fourth, because Perez is ultimately a 
claim based on the officer's subjective intent rather than the objective standard 
required by law. 
First, Perez argued below that Trooper Marquez "unlawfully extended the 
stop because Marquez had already determined that the vehicle was not 
abandoned, that the vehicle was not stolen, that the occupant was not involved in 
vandalism, and that the occupant was not in need of help." (R., p. 134.) He did 
not claim Trooper Marquez failed to investigate him for DUI. This issue is 
therefore not preserved for appellate review. 
Second, even if preserved, whether the police abandoned the DUI 
investigation to pursue a drug investigation is constitutionally irrelevant. "An 
investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop." 153 Idaho 405, 409, 283 
P.3d 722, 726 (2012) (quotes and citations omitted). "There is no rigid time limit 
for determining when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a 
court must consider the scope of the detention and the law enforcement 
purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop." 
1 Idaho 490,496,198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008). 
The district court concluded that the officers had reasonable suspicion to 
investigate both a possible DUI and a possible drug-related crime, (R., p, 135,) 
Therefore, the investigation of a possible drug crime was constitutionally 
reasonable regardless of whether the DUI investigation was also pursued. 
Danney, 153 Idaho at 0, 283 P,3d 726-27 (abandonment of investigation 
9 
into infraction did render unreasonable officers had reasonable 
suspicion of drug crime). 
Third, the record in no way supports Perez's claim that the police 
abandoned the DUI investigation. The record shows that, after his initial 
encounter with Perez (during which he developed reasonable suspicion of both 
DUI and drug-related criminal activity), Trooper Marquez took Perez's license 
and registration and contacted dispatch. (Tr., p. 24, Ls, 7-13,) He requested a 
drug detection dog and backup. (Tr., p. 24, L. 13 - p. 25, L, 3,) In the ten 
minutes it took backup to arrive Trooper Marquez conducted a status check on 
Perez's license and to determine if there were any outstanding warrants. (Tr., p, 
25, Ls, 4-18.) Once backup arrived Trooper Marquez re-contacted Perez, had 
him step out of his vehicle, noted Perez's marijuana-themed belt buckle, and 
asked Perez about "prior drug use." (Tr" p. 25, L. 19 - p, 28, 1,) Perez 
admitted having smoked marijuana, but claimed it had been "a long time ago," 
(Tr., p 28, Ls. 2-3) At that point the other officers now on the scene alerted 
Trooper Marquez to their discovery of evidence of contraband in plain sight. (Tr., 
p, 28, Ls, 4-18,) 
Perez's claim that the police abandoned the DUI investigation prior to the 
discovery of the contraband is unsupported by the record, Trooper Marquez, in 
the approximately ten minutes in question, contacted dispatch to find out about 
Perez's license and registration status and if he had any warrants, He also 
asked Perez about drug use, Both of these lines of investigation are entirely 
consistent with both a DUI investigation and a drug crime investigation, Perez's 
10 
Trooper should in 
(Appellant's 15) is without in or 
absence any evidence that Trooper Marquez was an expert in field 
testing to detect marijuana intoxication. Trooper Marquez's investigation was 
entirely reasonable, and Perez has failed to demonstrate otherwise on appeal. 
Finally, Perez claims that Trooper Marquez never articulated that he was 
conducting a DUI investigation during the course of that investigation and never 
"intended!! to conduct a DUI investigation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) Perez 
cites no law that would make these claims relevant, for although an officer must 
be able to articulate grounds for his suspicions to a court, Perez has cited no 
authority for the novel argument that an officer must articulate the type of 
investigation he is conducting, while he is conducting it, in order to have 
conducted it. Perez is blatantly requesting this Court to apply a subjective test 
when the law is crystal clear that the test is objective. State v. 
Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482,490,211 P.3d 91, 99 (2009) (employing an "objective 
test that does not depend upon the individual officer's subjective thought 
processes"). His argument is irrelevant. 
The district court concluded that the initial detention in this case was 
justified by reasonable suspicion of a parking violation and by the community 
caretaking function. Once the officer made contact with Perez he acquired 
evidence creating reasonable suspicion of DUI or drug-related crimes. Perez 
has failed to show error in the district court's factual findings or analysis, and has 
failed to show error on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully Court 
conviction. 
DATED this 5th day of March, 201 . 
Deputy Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 5th day of March, 2014, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
KI BERL Y SMITH 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
KKJ/pm 
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